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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
The court of appeal sustained the chattel mortgage by inter-
preting the Bulk Sales Law definition of "transfer" as one in
which the transferee has actually received the property (or
obtains the proceeds of its sale). The Supreme Court reversed,
apparently applying the "plain meaning" rule of statutory inter-
pretation that the statute specifically includes a mortgage within
its definition of transfers covered by this legislation, and it is in
the very nature of a mortgage as a security device that the
property remains in the possession of the mortgagor.
Although the Supreme Court decision was made by a divided
court (4 to 3), it would seem that the majority's interpretation
of the original legislative intent of the statute is probably correct
because the court of appeal's qualification of transfer would read
the word "mortgage" out of the definition entirely. On the other
hand, neither can it be said that the original legislative intent
was to include a chattel mortgage on a stock of merchandise
because this was not authorized until 1948. It can hardly be
stated with absolute assurance just what the legislature did
intend when the word "mortgage" was originally included in
the definition of "transfers" under the Bulk Sales Act. Under
the circumstances, the plain meaning of the statute is not dis-
placed by any more sophisticated interpretation.
It has already been noted that "Louisiana's position is unique.
The Bulk Sales Act found in Article 6 of the Uniform Commer-
cial Code is expressly made inapplicable to security transactions
in our sister states."3 5 The basic policy issues, as illustrated in





In Zeringue v. Blouin,' possession of a part was deemed
possession of the whole of contiguous lands described in the
deed of a good faith possessor, although no part of the land
35. Note, 15 LA. BAR J. 232 (1967), referring to UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
art. 6, § 103(1), and art. 9, § 111 (see also Comment) (1962).
1. 192 So.2d 838 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1966), writ refused, 250 La. 100, 194 So.2d
98 (1967). The case did not involve any facts to invoke well-settled juris-
prudence that the rule is inapplicable to noncontiguous parcels and to any
situation where the true owner against whom prescription is claimed is
himself in constructive possession by actual possession of a contiguous part
of his estate.
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claimed by ten-year prescription had ever been actually pos-
sessed. The limitation upon articles 34372 and 3498,3 recognized
by language in Sessions v. Tensaw River Planting Co.,4 was
rejected as inconsistent with the later decision in Leader Realty
Co. v. Taylor.5 In Sessions, the Supreme Court had stated:
"[T]he land of which a part must have been possessed in
order that the principle should come into play is the land
sought to be acquired by prescription, and not some other
land. The idea is that if the owner sees anyone in possession
of any part of his land he is'put on notice. But an owner
is not thus put on notice, and prescription cannot run against
him, unless someone is in possession of some part of his
land."6
This writer agrees with the result of Zeringue because of its
extreme facts, which gave notice considerations a hollow ring.
But it seems erroneous to conclude that the Sessions view should
not be applied in any case where notice considerations are
meaningful.
The Leader opinion did not consider the Sessions case.7 The
transcript in Leader shows that there was no possible factual
basis for considering the Sessions exception to the general rule.8
2. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 3437 (1870): It is not necessary that a person wish-
ing to take possession of an estate should pass over every part of it; it is
sufficient if he enters on and occupies a part of the land, provided it be with
the intention of possessing all that is included within the boundaries."
3. Id. art. 3498: "When a person has a title and possession conformably
to it, he is presumed to possess according to the title and to the full extent
of its limits."
4. 142 La. 399, 76 So. 816 (1917).
5. 147 La. 256, 84 So. 648 (1920). Actually, this case stands for no more
than the general rule about possession of a part, and is not inconsistent with
Sessions.
6. 142 La. 399, 401, 76 So. 816 (1917). The notion that the deed of the
possessor would constructively furnish such notice was rejected in Sessions
because even if recorded, registry is for the benefit of those who wish to
contract and was never designed as a means of ousting the owner, who
should not have to concern himself with claims others are recording. See,
e.g., Moore Planting Co. v. Morgan's La. & Tex. R.R. & Steamship Co., 126
La. 840, 880, 53 So. 22, 35 (1910). A fortiori, if the deed is not recorded, con-
structive notice by the deed alone seems clearly impossible.
7. In Leader, there was clear corporeal possession of a front portion not
in dispute, but the opinion reflected no information about whether the rear
triangle claimed by prescription had ever been corporeally possessed. The
court stated that the question was whether the description in the defendant's
deeds sufficiently identified the disputed triangle. Having resolved that issue
favorably to the defendant, the court applied articles 3437 and 3498 to hold
that the ten-year prescription was perfected on the rear triangle, stating
the possession of a part rule and noting the contiguity of the rear tract with
the unquestionably well-possessed and undisputed front tract.
8. The rear triangular part and front portion were surveyed for the de-
fendant in 1904, and the surveyor testified the disputed triangular portion
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To use a general rule without discussing whether there was
evidence to warrant an exception does not destroy the excep-
tion.
Moreover, none of the other decisions cited in Zeringue9 as
having followed Leader revealed any facts which would have
necessitated consideration of the Sessions limitation. At least
one other case which distinguished Leader was not mentioned.'?
Under the Zeringue facts the record title claimants could
hardly have claimed prejudice by want of notice through actual
adverse possession. Those extreme facts" make the language of
was cut over timberland. Tr. 171. An old neighbor testified that one of the
defendant's ancestors in title had cleared all the timber off the disputed land.
Tr. 174. Other witnesses testified as to defendant's old fences running into
the disputed back area, e.g., at Tr. 131, 132, 136, and 193, and even that the
disputed triangle had had "some portion of it" under old fences. Tr. 141.
References are to the transcript pages in the Record of Leader Realty Co.
v. Taylor, 147 La. 256, 84 So. 649 (1920).
9. 192 So.2d 838, 844 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1966). Although the numerous
decisions there cited all indeed applied the "possession of a part" rule none
showed facts to establish that the disputed land had had an absence of
actual corporeal adverse possession and some definitely showed the con-
trary, e.g., Tremont Lumber Co. v. Powers & Critchett Lumber Co., 173 La.
937, 139 So. 12 (1932) (adverse possessor's lessee lived on part of the disputed
land); Smith v. Southern Kraft Corp., 202 La. 1019, 13 So.2d 335 (adverse
timber cutting on disputed tract). Smith was mistakenly cited in Wilson v.
Gulf, Mobile & Ohio R.R., 181 So.2d 406, 411 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1965) (actual
possession on disputed part) as having applied the rule where there was
no actual possession of the disputed part.
10. Ellington v. Ellis & Dorsett, 2 La. App. 715, 722 (2d Cir. 1925). In
Ellington, the disputed land in one parish adjoined lands in a second parish.
The entirety of the lands were described together in deeds in the chain of
title of the adverse possessor. But his actual acts of possession were con-
fined to the lands in the second parish. His deeds had been recorded only
in the second parish and the title out of the sovereign was by different
grants, facts which were seized upon to buttress the conclusion that the
"possession of a part" rule was inapplicable. It seems that the court in
Ellington was actually following without citation the notice principle of
Sessions. See note 16 infra.
11. The defendants' author had purchased by an 1895 recorded deed
describing two contiguous parcels-front high ground with unquestionably
valid title, and the disputed rear swamp land. The front portion had been
actually possessed by the defendants or their authors since 1895, but the
unusable swamp had not been actually possessed. Defendants or their
author had paid taxes and granted numerous recorded mineral leases on
all of the property since 1895.
The plaintiffs admitted they had no pretense of ownership at least be-
tween 1895 and 1939, when a Zeringue heir discovered and recorded an 1857
land patent to Charles Zeringue. The defendants' author's 1895 deed recited
that the vendor had acquired from Charles Zeringue. Although the existence
of a deed from Charles Zeringue was not proved, one might attach im-
portance to the 1895 deed's recital, especially when coupled with the fact
that no legal claim was asserted until after the discovery of oil more than
60 years later. See Lefitte, Dufilho & Co. v. Godchaux, 35 La. Ann. 1161, 1163(1883), quoted in the text at note 21 infra. Plaintiffs were unable to show
any possession of or physical or civil acts affecting any part of the larger
tract their patent covered, or any payment of taxes or attention to the prop-
erty whatsoever, until the 1939 patent recordation.
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the Supreme Court, in denying a writ, especially interesting:
"On the facts found . . . we find no error of law. ' 12 An analysis
of article 3487 suggests that under different facts where notice
would be meaningful Sessions should be followed.
Article 3487 provides that the possession necessary to plead
ten-year prescription must be "public and unequivocal; a clan-
destine possession would give no right to prescribe." If not
clandestine in the sense of intentionally secret, possession by
acts on property other than the property claimed by prescription
hardly seems "public and unequivocal"'1 or open and notorious"'14
as to the property claimed by prescription and as to its owner.
Aubry and Rau state:
"Possession is clandestine, that means not open, if the acts
by which it was acquired and continued were not such as to
be known on the outside, especially to those persons against
whom they are to be claimed.... Clandestinity is a purely
relative defect which can be subject to claim only by those
who could not have known about the possession" 5 (Em-
phasis added.)
The essence of the Aubry and Rau relative defect approach
to the absence of a public or unequivocal character is that
owners who are not prejudiced thereby should not be heard
to complain. This justifies the Zeringue precedent only if it is
limited to cases with similar exceptional facts.
If not restricted to its extreme facts, the effect of Zeringue
would apparently make it important that an owner exercise
actual possession on at least part of his property to avoid the
risk that his land might be included in the deeds of contiguous
owners whose actual possession of contiguous lands would either
go unnoticed or not excite alarm.' 6 Such a result seems contrary
12. 250 La. 100, 194 So.2d 98 (1967).
13. Public and unequivocal concepts of art. 3487 were apparently derived
from CODE CIVIL art. 2229, and under French law, it is immaterial whether
clandestine possession was intentionally secret. This would be material only
to good faith problems, as article 3487 suggests. 2 AUBRY & RAU, DROIT CIVIL
FRANgAIS-PROPERTY (AN ENGLISH TRANSLATION BY THE LOUISIANA STATE LAW
INSTITUTE) § 180(2) (1966).
14. See, e.g., Simon v. Richard, 42 La. Ann. 842, 8 So. 629 (1890).
15. 2 AuRY & RAU, DROIT CIVIL FRANCAIS-PROPERTY (AN ENGLISH TRANS-
LATION SY THE LOUISIANA STATE LAW INSTITUTE) § 180(2) (1966).
16. See Ellington v. Ellis & Dorsett, 2 La. App. 715, 721 (2d Cir. 1925):
"One having a perfect title should not be obliged to take actual possession
to guard against the danger of losing it by a hostile possession merely con-
structive of which he could have no knowledge except by reading the deeds
of everybody in the neighborhood to see whether his land was included in
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXVIII
to article 496, which clearly negates any notion that an owner
must possess to maintain ownership.1'7 The owner is not less
the owner because he fails to perform acts of ownership; it is
only where the owner permits a third person to remain in pos-
session that he risks loss of ownership by prescription.18 To
permit connotes either knowledge of the adverse possession to
be permitted; or, at the very least, neglect in not discovering
or ejecting the possessor.19 By this analysis, Zeringue might be
technically justified as a case of neglect. This view would render
article 3498 and Zeringue consistent with articles 496 and 3487;
preserve the general requirement of reasonable notice rec-
ognized in cases where it was meaningful;20 and produce a just
result for neglect cases consistent with the long-held view that
"The genius of our law does not favor the claims of those
who have long slept on their rights and who, after years of
inertia, conveying an assurance of acquiescence in a given
state of things, suddenly wake up at the welcome vision of
an unexpected advantage and invoke the aid of the courts
for relief, under the effect of a newly discovered technical
error in some ancient transaction or settlement."2 '
Further ground for flexible handling of the Zeringue prece-
dent lies in the fact that article 3498 only creates a rebuttable
presumption that actual possession of a part extends to the
limits of lands described in a deed.2 It is submitted that an
owner should normally23 be permitted to rebut this often fic-
them or not." Actual possession by a true owner of a part of a contiguous
estate would of course result in constructive possession of the whole and
would defeat any prescriptive claim based on merely constructive possession
claimed by an adverse possessor by reason of the same rule. Comment, 12
TUL. L. REV. 608, 615 (1938) and authorities there cited.
17. This is not to say that an owner may totally neglect his property
without risk to his title, when another is in possession.
18. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 496 (1870).
19. WEBSTER, NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1824 (2d ed. unabridged 1957).
20. Sessions v. Tensaw River Planting Co., 142 La. 399, 76 So. 816 (1917);
Ellington v. Ellis & Dorsett, 2 La. App. 715 (2d Cir. 1925).
21. Lafitte, Dufllho & Co. v. Godchaux, 35 La. Ann. 1161, 1163-64 (1883).
22. Agurs v. Holt, 232 La. 1026, 95 So.2d 644 (1957).
23. I.e., where there are facts contrary to the Zeringue facts. Perhaps an
owner who has never had corporeal possession can yet show he has visited
his property or patrolled it infrequently; paid taxes, frequently entered into
business transactions, or exercised other civil acts regarding the property;
or perhaps he can show that the land was usuable and accessible and he or
his representative were so situated that neighbors would have been apt to
report adverse possession. Such circumstances ought to form a basis for
contending that the absence of any actual possession of any part of the land
claimed by prescription was so seriously unfair to the owner as to warrant
not applying the presumption. If an owner, so prejudiced by the absence of
actual possession, is held to have been divested of ownership by application
1968] WORK OF APPELLATE COURTS-1966-1967 351
tional presumption by showing that there were no acts suffici-
ent to put an owner on notice of the adverse possession, i.e., no
actual possession of any part of the land claimed by prescrip-
tion.
The need for certainty in title transactions has caused a
"public policy of the State that land titles shall remain stable
so that property will always be transferable in commerce. '"24
This policy might justify total rejection of the Zeringue opinion,
rather than mere confinement to its facts, to avoid factual
analysis that might sometimes cloud titles in marginal cases, if
it were not for positive law and equitable reasons discussed
above, which at least partially balance the interest in certainty
of titles. However, it seems very clear that the alternative of
greatly extending Zeringue to less extreme facts would definitely
play havoc with certainty of titles, and greatly increase the
economic cost and delays of title work.25
The Second Circuit Court of Appeal decided Smith v. Burks26
contemporaneously with the Zeringue decision of the First Cir-
cuit. Although the opinion was unclear on whether the descrip-
tion of a deed was employed to assert the possession of a part
rule, it appears that the court took a basically contrary position
to Zeringue's rationale by holding that there was no actual
possession of a disputed small parcel merely by reason of actual
possession of undisputed portions of a larger tract which included
the parcel.
In Downs v. McNeal,27 the record owner's corporeal posses-
sion of a part and his resultant constructive possession of the
of articles 3437 and 3498, this writer would wonder about the contract clause
constitionality of such an application of the articles, a question beyond the
scope of this writer's present research.
24. Trahan v. Broussard, 206 So.2d 82, 86 (La. 1968).
25. An attorney examining title from the public records by name indices
or without benefit of an abstract prepared from a well-kept tract index
would never discover recorded intrusive deeds. Examination of contiguous
tracts, where any of the contiguous lands were not actually possessed, would
be ineffective because there would be no way of knowing whether deeds to
lands contiguous to the contiguous lands had overlapping mistaken de-
scriptions or whether there were unrecorded intrusive deeds. Even in areas
where abstract companies maintain good tract indices, description mistakes
or uncertainty, and survey complications, would be magnified. If the attorney
excepted this problem from his opinion, title insurance policies would
normally except the problem. In many areas, it is often difficult to perfect
curative possession information on the tract under examination; to have to
perfect possession, information on numerous tracts to approve title to a
single tract would often be a practical impossibility.
26. 192 So.2d 919 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1966).
27. 193 So.2d 843 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1967).
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remainder of a disputed parcel was correctly held to control
over the purely constructive possession of the plaintiff, who held
a merely just title to the disputed parcel. The plaintiff's title
described six contiguous acres: two he had valid title to and
actually possessed; the other four were unsuccessfully claimed
on the basis of ten-year prescription.
Trahan v. Broussard divided the Third Circuit Court of
Appeal2 and the Supreme Court" on the issue of whether R.S.
9:568230 required that the third person's possession be in good
faith. The court of appeal majority held that the prescription
was liberative and therefore did not require good faith, because
the language of the statute barred an action and did not relate
to the acquisition of ownership. Judge Tate, in dissent, reasoned
that the prescription effectively divests ownership by another's
possession and was acquisitive. He stated it should require
good faith possession, both to prevent fraud and because the
legislation was an apparent response to jurisprudence holding
that judgments of possession were not "just titles." Further, the
dissenter stated that even liberative prescription can require
good faith.
The Supreme Court majority held that the third person
acquires title and the prescription is therefore acquisitive; but
affirmed the judgment on the principal ground that the legisla-
ture would have stated good faith as a requirement if good
faith was required.
The Supreme Court dissent reasoned that laws in pari
materia must be construed together. Since the statute was in
response to jurisprudence refusing to treat judgments of posses-
sion as translative of property, it was intended to merely make
ordinary ten-year prescription principles applicable where third
persons were involved.
The problem was whether the statute required good faith
possession. More basically, the problem posed a need to balance
two potentially conflicting interests: protection of inheritance
rights, especially against possible fraud or abuse of succession
28. 196 So.2d 858 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1967).
29. 206 So.2d 82 (La. 1968).
30. LA. R.S. 9:5682 (Supp. 1966), La. Acts 1960, No. 584, provides, in
essence, that an action by an unrecognized heir or legatee to assert any right
in property of a deceased against a third person other than one recognized as
an heir or legatee in a judgment of possession is prescribed in ten years, if
the third person or his ancestors in title, singly or collectively, have been in
possession for such period after the registry of the judgment.
[Vol. XXVIII
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procedure; versus stabilization of titles, through affording greater
prescriptive benefits where third persons rely upon succession
judgments.
The apparent primary purpose of the statute is to serve the
latter interest, because it plainly gave substantial prescriptive
effect to such judgments and was apparently in response to
jurisprudence' which had disserved that interest. However, the
statute did not ignore protection of inheritance rights from
abuses, else the prescription would not have been limited to
actions against third persons. So proper respect for legislative
intent would give weight to both interests, but as to conflicts
generally tip the scales in favor of title stability.
Therefore, it was correct to refuse to require good faith.
To "plug in" this new prescription to old arbitrary good faith
prescription rules would substantially defeat its principal pur-
pose. Good faith rules would make it highly unlikely that a
third person could benefit from the prescription if he relied
upon a succession judgment.3 2 It would be even more difficult
to find that the false heirs placed in possession by an erroneous
judgment were in good faith,3 3 if this were a relevant problem.8 4
The absence of a legal good faith requirement should not
mean a total absence of protection against all radical succession
judgment irregularities. The theory of absolute nullities (or
void or radical nullities) ought to be employed to give limited
protection to inheritance rights and institutions without unduly
sacrificing stability of titles. By the theory urged, if a judgment
were an absolute nullity, it would be legally nonexistent and
render the statute inapplicable unless the third person had no
31. See authorities cited in the court of appeal dissent, 196 So.2d 858,
865 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1967), with which the Supreme Court majority and
dissent apparently agreed, except as to the significance of the fact that the
legislation was in response to this jurisprudence.
32. See Dinwiddie v. Cox, 9 So.2d 68 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1942), regarding
the very strong duty to ascertain all heirship facts, and make correct legal
conclusions, once an investigation is undertaken. Since a judgment of pos-
session is only prima facie valid (LA. CODE OF Civ. P. art. 2004 (1960)), it
could not alone be relied upon, but rather to look to it might only trigger
a duty to ascertain all the true facts. See Juneau v. Laborde, 219 La. 921,
54 So.2d 325 (1951); Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1951-1952
Term-Prescription, 13 LA. L. Rzv. 262, 264 (1953).
33. Because they would have had an attorney who should normally in-
vestigate heirship for the succession. See Martin v. Schwing Lumber &
Shingle Co., 228 La. 175, 81 So.2d 852 (1955).
34. The letter of the statute suggests that a third person purchasing
more than ten years after registry of the judgment could tack onto the
possession of his false heir-vendor.
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actual notice of the defects or the defects were not apparent
on the face of the judgment.35 This limited protection would not
interfere with policy favoring stability of titles to promote the
legitimate transfer of property in commerce, since a legitimate
purchaser would have no duty to investigate beyond the face
of the judgment of possession, in order to be protected by the
prescription. Further protection of inheritance rights ought to
be afforded by examining whether the third person relying upon
the statute is a straw man for a false heir named in the illegal
judgment.
Cason v. Oglesby"6 is subject to possible future misinter-
pretation. In a petitory action, the defendant pleaded a visible
boundary and possession for more than thirty years, without
clear specification as to the type of prescription pleaded. The
trial court ruled that prescription had not been properly pleaded
nor proved "under the pertinent articles." The court of appeal
considered the prescription plea as apparently abandoned on
appeal, noting a stipulation that plaintiff was the "record owner"
and that the only error specified on appeal was alleged error
in employing as a basis for judgment an ex parte plat of survey.
The court concluded that the allegation that the suit had been
converted into a boundary action was the only remaining issue,
and ruled against defendant because she had not asked for a
fixing of boundaries.
Although the facts and legal rationale are not clearly stated,
it seems the court was convinced that article 852 and general
thirty-year prescription claims had been abandoned. This being
the case, the opinion should not be construed as implying that
article 852 boundary prescription can only be raised in a bound-
ary action. Other recent decisions have followed established
jurisprudence to the contrary.T
The court's reinforcement of its conclusion that the prescrip-
tive claims had been abandoned by pointing to the "record
owner" stipulation seems questionable. Ownership based upon
prescription is not necessarily reflected on the public records.
35. See, e.g., Giddens v. Mobley, 37 La. Ann. 417 (1885); Callahan v.
Authement, 99 So.2d 531 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1957). A defect on the face of an
instrument gives notice, so absence of notice of the defect is what protects
third persons. Therefore, actual knowledge of the defect should remove this
protection.
36. 188 So.2d 718 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1966), writ refused, 249 La. 842, 191
So.2d 642 (1966).
37. Martin Timber Co. v. Taylor, 187 So.2d 196 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1966);
Bergeron v. Overhultz, 194 So.2d 445 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1966).
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One comes away from a reading of other recent article 852
boundary prescription cases, which do not merit discussion for
lack of new or important legal questions, with the feeling that
if there is conflicting testimony it can be very difficult to con-
vince a court that a long-standing fence has not been in place
more than thirty years.
LiERATrIvE
In Freestate Industrial Development Co. v. T. & H., Inc.8
it was held that a cause of action for damages based upon an
alleged interference with natural drainage by altering its flow
is a cause of action resulting from an abuse of a servitude owed
by the plaintiff's estate to the defendant's estate, under article
660. Therefore, it was held that the ten-year prescriptive period
applied and not the one-year period for offenses or quasi-offenses.
The court's reasoning is logical, but if this result is compelled
by the Code, one might question the wisdom of the wise
redactors of the Code. The problem of ascertaining facts and
causation of damages ten years after the act might often pose
terrific evidence and proof problems. Although one year may
be too short a period, something less than ten years seems in
order, which raises the question of a need for Code revision.
MINERAL RIGHTS
*George W. Hardy, III
MINERAL SERVITUDES
Prescription-Effect of Operations under Community Lease
The case of Hall v. LeMay' involved one of those increasing-
ly troublesome situations in which co-owners of property en-
tered into a partition and attempted to reserve mineral rights
in indivision. During the life of the mineral rights so reserved,
the various land and mineral owners entered into a lease under
which production was achieved. The well site, however, was not
on that portion of the partitioned estate involved in the litiga-
tion. Thus, it was contended by the owner of the tract in question
that the act of partition had created separate mineral servitudes
on each of the lots resulting from the partition, that there had
38. 188 So.2d 746 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1966)
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 191 So.2d 720 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1966).
